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Abstract 
This paper explores whether social preferences influence portfolio choices of retail 
investors. We use administrative investor trading records which we link to decisions of 
the same investors in experiments with real money at stake. We show that social 
preferences rather than return expectations or risk perceptions are the main driver of 
investments in socially responsible (SRI) mutual funds. Social preferences are only 
associated with investments in SRI funds without tax benefits, but are unrelated to 
investments in SRI funds with tax incentives. This illustrates that tax incentives change 
the clientele of mutual funds and that tax incentives crowd out the intrinsic motivations of 
investors with strong social preferences. Our results also show that prosocial behavior in 
one domain (experiment) is correlated with prosocial behavior in another domain 
(investments), which adds to the discussion on the usefulness of experiments in finance. 
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1. Introduction 
Socially responsible investors create a conundrum as they deviate from the market by 
excluding certain ‘sin’ companies from their portfolio or by focusing on companies with 
good environmental policies, employee relations, and so forth. Paradoxically, it also 
appears that this deviation from the market is not vanishing but rather increasing. In 
Europe socially responsible investments are growing in volume (EUROSIF, 2012) and in 
the United States approximately one in nine dollars of professionally managed assets are 
involved in social responsible investments (SIF, 2012). A few papers show that socially 
responsible investments sometimes perform financially better or at least not worse than 
conventional investments (Bauer, Otten and Koedijk (2005), Derwall et al. 2005, Kempf 
and Osthoff 2007, Edmans 2011). However, there is also clear evidence that investing 
socially responsible can be financially costly. For instance, Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant 
(2008) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that divesting from ‘sin’ industries that 
involve weapons, tobacco, alcohol or gambling is costly because these companies tend to 
perform better than ‘non-sin’ companies. Also Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2008) 
find that SRI equity funds underperform relative to conventional equity funds. Given the 
evidence, the observed deviation from the market portfolio is difficult to explain on the 
basis of financial performance alone. This suggests that other motives than performance 
expectations are important in the decision to invest socially responsible. 
In contrast to conventional mutual funds, socially responsible mutual funds have a 
focus on broader societal issues. For example, they invest in companies that respect 
human rights, invest in good employee relations, focus on environmental protection, etc. 
(Social Investment Forum, 2012). The societal focus of such funds implies a public good 
component, suggesting that socially responsible investors are not only interested in their 
own material well-being but also in the well-being of others. In other words, it seems 
likely that other-regarding or social preferences are important determinants of socially 
responsible investments. Bollen (2007) and Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) provide 
suggestive evidence that this could indeed be the case. The former finds that ex post 
investors are more likely to hold on to bad performing social responsible investment 
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funds than to hold on to bad performing conventional funds. The latter find that 
Democratic fund managers select stocks that score higher on social responsibility than the 
stocks selected by Republican fund managers. Importantly, these studies do not directly 
measure preferences and it is, therefore, unclear whether investors' behavior is indeed 
influenced by their social or political preferences. 
In this paper we directly measure social preferences and provide first evidence of 
whether such preferences indeed affect portfolio choice by investing socially responsible. 
This evidence is important, as observed deviations from the market portfolio could 
influence stock prices in the long run if they were caused by (stable) social preferences 
and SRI keeps growing at its current pace (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). In contrast, 
differences in performance expectations would probably only generate short run effects 
on asset prices, because potential mispricing of socially responsible companies should 
disappear as investors learn over time (Derwall, Koedijk and Ter Horst, 2011). 
Understanding the role of social preferences is also important for mutual fund managers 
and pension funds. If investors solely care about risk and return, fund managers should 
only restrict their investment universe to socially responsible funds if they expect higher 
risk-adjusted returns on socially responsible companies than on other companies. In 
contrast, if individuals' investment behavior is also guided by their social preferences 
fund managers should also focus on the broader societal impact of their investments. 
Knowledge about the role of social preferences for portfolio choice could also 
provide insights into the role of investor preferences in other prominent examples of 
deviations from the market portfolio, like the home and the local bias (Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999), Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), Pool, Stoffman and Yonker (2012)), 
excessive investments in employer stocks (Cohen (2009)) and the investor’s car 
manufacturer (Keloharju, Knüpfer and Linnainmaa (2012)), the evidence on ex post 
performance of investors exhibiting such biases is quite mixed (Ivković and Weisbenner 
(2005), Cohen (2009), Pool, Stoffman and Yonker (2012)). Therefore, if social 
preferences are important in portfolio choice these other deviations from the market 
portfolio may also have a preference based explanation. 
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To assess the role of social preferences in socially responsible investments we use 
a unique combination of three data sources. First, we gather administrative data from a 
large mutual fund provider in the Netherlands; second, we conduct incentivized 
artefactual field experiments; third, we collect additional information through a survey. 
The mutual fund provider offers both a large variety of socially responsible and 
conventional mutual funds, for which investors are personally responsible. That is, they 
buy and sell their funds directly online without the interference of an intermediary. The 
administrative data contain the monthly portfolio holdings of retail investors, their 
returns, and basic demographics. The data also comprise the total amount and proportion 
of the portfolio invested in socially responsible investment funds with and without tax 
incentives as well as all investments in conventional mutual funds. For our analysis we 
link the administrative data to sampled survey responses and behavior in the experiments. 
For our purpose, it is important to have an independent measure of social 
preferences that is as little as possible affected by considerations regarding reputation or 
strategic fairness (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982)) and, hence, measures 
intrinsic social preferences. In order to get such a measure we let investors participate in 
an anonymous one-shot trust game experiment (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), 
Fehr and List (2004), Karlan (2005), Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010)). The trust 
game is a two player sequential game where the first-mover can transfer money to a 
second-mover. The transferred amount is tripled by the experimenter. The second-mover 
can send back nothing, parts, or all of the received money to the first-mover. It is the 
behavior of investors in the role of second-movers which endows us with the measure of 
social preferences. In a case where the second-mover is fully selfish he should not send 
back any money. The more an investor returns, the stronger are his or her social 
preferences. We avoid repeated game effects by the one-shot nature of the experiment and 
minimize potential reputation effects through the anonymity of investors. We are, 
therefore, confident that the amount sent back by the second-mover is indeed a good 
measure of intrinsic social preferences. Moreover, second-mover behavior in trust games 
has already been shown to have predictive power for prosocial field behavior (Karlan 
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(2005), Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010)). Next to the trust game, investors also 
participate in a financially incentivized risk preferences elicitation task (Holt and Laury 
(2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011)). This gives us an independent measure of risk 
preferences and allows us to control for risk preferences when examining the factors 
determining investors' portfolio choice. 
The third element in our empirical research strategy consists of the survey data. 
Such data are useful for eliciting factors that are otherwise difficult to gather (see, e.g., 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (forthcoming)). In identifying whether social preferences 
are an important determinant for investing socially responsible we need to control for 
individual differences in return expectations and risk perceptions regarding conventional 
and socially responsible investments. As these variables are not available in the form of 
administrative data on the individual level, we use survey questions to gather them. In 
addition, we also use survey questions to get data on other control variables that are 
potentially important for investment behavior, like investment knowledge, income level, 
age, gender, etc. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find clear evidence that social 
preferences matter in portfolio choice. In particular, investors with stronger intrinsic 
social preferences are more likely to hold SRI funds without tax incentives. Interestingly, 
this is not the case for SRI funds with tax incentives. Moreover, in contrast to social 
preferences, expectations about the returns of and risk perceptions on SRI funds are 
unrelated to investments in SRI funds. Hence, our evidence supports a preference-based 
explanation for portfolio distortions rather than a belief-based explanation. The finding 
that intrinsic social preferences are unrelated to investments in SRI funds with tax 
incentives is also important in light of the literature on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
(Gneezy and Rustichini (2000 a,b), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Ariely, Bracha and Meier 
(2009)). It shows that SRI funds with extrinsic incentives attract different investor types 
than SRI funds without such incentives. We also discuss the possibility that investors use 
SRI as a device to signal pro-social motivations. In that respect, our evidence suggests 
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that investors with stronger intrinsic social preferences are less likely to use socially 
responsible investments as a signal to improve their pro-social reputation. 
2. Hypothesis development and literature review 
In this section, we derive our main hypothesis that social preferences have an important 
influence on portfolio choice in the form of socially responsible investments. We first 
discuss potential financial reasons to invest in SRI funds, followed by evidence of the 
effect of social preferences on other economic choices and third talk about the role of 
social preferences in financial decisions. 
 
2.1 Financial reasons to invest in SRI funds 
According to modern portfolio theory, investors create portfolios based on an optimal 
risk-return trade-off. For socially responsible investments this implies that investors 
would never hold SRI funds if they thereby worsened the risk-return profile of their 
portfolio. Hence, given the increasing interest in socially responsible investments 
(EUROSIF (2012), SIF (2012)) one should expect that SRI funds perform at least as well 
as the market. Some papers suggest that SRI funds could potentially outperform 
conventional funds or that the performance is the same, but others find that SRI funds 
underperform compared to other funds (Bauer, Otten and Koedijk (2005), Kempf and 
Osthoff (2007), Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant (2008), Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang 
(2008), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Edmans (2011)). Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
steady growth in socially responsible investments can be explained by financial reasons 
alone. However, if investors differ in their subjective (out-of-equilibrium) expectations it 
may still be that some investors (incorrectly) expect SRI funds to financially outperform 
other funds. We will, therefore, control for these beliefs in our analysis. 
An alternative financial motivation could be differential tax treatment. In the 
Netherlands, where our data set is gathered, certain types of SRI funds indeed offer tax 
benefits. In order to explore the role of tax benefits we will analyze the determinants of 
investing in SRI funds with and without such preferential tax treatment.  
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2.2 Social preferences: theory and empirical evidence 
There is mounting evidence from the laboratory and the field that people often do not 
only care about their own material well-being but as well care about the well-being of 
others (see, e.g., Ledyard (1995), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Karlan (2005), Egas and 
Riedl (2008), Falk and Heckman (2009)).1 Such social (aka other-regarding) preferences 
constitute a profound deviation from the standard neoclassical homo economicus 
assumption still prevalent in the finance literature. We are interested in whether social 
preferences are also important in portfolio choice an area hitherto neglected in finance as 
well as by research on social preferences. 
 
2.3 Social preferences and investments 
Recent evidence in finance suggests that investors' preferences over non-material values, 
like political preferences, can influence portfolio choice (e.g. Bollen (2007), Kaustia and 
Torstila (2011), Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), Kumar and Page (forthcoming)). The 
evidence that is provided by these studies, however, is indirect as they do not measure 
preferences over immaterial values. It is, therefore, unclear whether investors deviate 
from holding the market portfolio because of their preferences or because of some other 
(unobserved) variable. For instance, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that Democratic 
fund managers are more likely to invest in stocks with good social responsibility than are 
Republican fund managers. It could be that Democratic investors (incorrectly) expect that 
socially responsible stocks outperform the market. 
We hypothesize that it is indeed social preferences that (co-)determine portfolio 
choice. Specifically, we hypothesize that investors with stronger social preferences are 
more likely to invest in socially responsible mutual funds (Hypothesis I). Moreover, as 
                                                           
1
  For theoretical approaches modeling such behavior see, among others, Rabin (1993), Andreoni (1990), 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). See Sobel (2005) for a critical discussion. 
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discussed in section 2.1 investors with purely financial motives could hold SRI funds for 
reasons of preferential tax treatment. We investigate this issue and hypothesize that social 
preferences are positively related to investments in SRI funds without tax benefits but are 
unrelated (or at least weaker related) to investments in SRI funds with tax benefits 
(Hypothesis II). The reason is that the latter can be held for financial reasons by investors 
not motivated by social preferences. Moreover, it has been shown that extrinsic 
incentives sometimes can crowd out intrinsic pro-social motivations (Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000 a,b), Benabou and Tirole (2006)). Therefore, it may even be that 
investors with strong social preferences prefer not to invest in funds with tax benefits. 
 
3. The data 
In this section, we first describe the administrative investor data, followed by a 
description of the survey and details on the experiments. We then describe our main 
variables. 
 
3.1 Administrative investor data 
We utilize administrative individual investor data from one of the largest mutual fund 
providers in the Netherlands, covering the period January 1992 – August 2012. The 
mutual fund provider offers a wide range of investment funds, including equity funds, 
bond funds and mixed funds.2 Within these categories the funds can be global, sector-
specific, socially responsible funds, and so on. Especially important for our study, the 
administrative data show for each investor whether or not s/he holds a socially 
                                                           
2
  Figure A1 in the appendix shows a screenshot of the product selector of the mutual fund provider. The 
product selector shows for each fund to which category it belongs and whether the provider classifies 
the fund as sustainable, emerging markets, global, etc. At the same screen, investors can read about the 
details of the fund including the details regarding stock selections based on social responsibility criteria. 
In addition, the product selector gives information such as past performance, Morningstar ratings and 
fees. 
8 
 
responsible mutual fund and the shares invested in SRI funds and all other funds, on a 
monthly basis. 
Moreover, for investors holding SRI funds we can distinguish between money 
invested in SRI funds that offer tax benefits and SRI funds without tax benefits. The 
former are SRI bond funds for which the Dutch government gave tax incentives that 
could reach a maximum of 2.2% of the amount invested in the month relevant for the 
study.3 The reason that these funds offer tax benefits is of political nature as the money is 
invested in specific companies or projects that the Dutch government wants to subsidize 
(e.g., producers of windmills and organic farmers). These SRI funds with tax benefits are 
equity funds comparable to SRI equity funds offered in the United States (SIF, 2012) and 
the rest of Europe (EUROSIF, 2012). Fund managers of SRI funds with tax benefits are 
thus restricted in their investment choices. In contrast, managers of SRI funds without tax 
benefits are free in the selection of companies in which they invest. SRI funds with tax 
benefits are defined by Dutch tax law, which is also the definition we use. For SRI funds 
without tax benefits we use the classification of the mutual fund provider of socially 
responsible and sustainable funds.4 
 
3.2 The survey 
Survey questions have some known limitations. For instance, participants might differ 
from non-participants and the answers of respondents may depend upon the framing of 
the questions. We discuss a potential response bias in our results below and conclude that 
if a response bias is present, they likely weaken the effect sizes that we identify and we, 
                                                           
3
  If not stated otherwise all used administrative investor data refer to the month when the survey and 
experiment were conducted (June 2011). 
4
  The survey indicates that 83% of all investors (also those who do not hold SRI funds) respond positive 
or neutral to the statement that socially responsible investments have a positive influence on society. 
Only 26% of the investors indicate in another statement that they believe that SRI funds are a marketing 
trick to sell more funds. We are therefore confident that funds defined as SRI funds are also perceived 
as such by most investors. 
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hence, are on the conservative side. Regarding framing effects, it is important to note that 
all investors received similarly framed questions. Because we are primarily interested in 
the different beliefs and attitudes of socially responsible and conventional investors, the 
effects of framing should be equal for both groups. Surveys also have major benefits. In 
our case, it allows us to measure return expectations and risk perceptions that would 
otherwise remain unobserved. Moreover, we can also gather information on additional 
important control variables, like their self-rated investment knowledge, income level, 
gender, age etc. 
The administrative data provide information on 3,382 socially responsible 
investors, which were all invited to participate in the survey. Next to the socially 
responsible investors, we randomly selected about 35,000 investors of the approximately 
145,000 remaining accounts in the database.5 All selected investors received an email that 
contained a link to the online survey in spring 2011. The response rate was 8% for 
conventional investors and 12% for socially responsible investors (see Table A1 in the 
appendix for a comparison the two samples regarding several important variables 
observed in the administrative data). We on purpose invited disproportionately more SR 
investors to increase the power of the analyses that compare SR investors to conventional 
investors. Relative to the invited sample, there are slightly more men, older investors and 
investors with a larger portfolio, among the respondents. We control for these and other 
demographics in our analyses. 
In the online survey investors answered questions and took part in experiments 
with monetary incentives (for details see below). At the beginning of the online survey 
respondents received some general information. In addition, they were also informed that 
they would take part in several experiments, but were not informed about the content of 
the experiments until they actually took place. In this introduction also the general 
procedure regarding possible money earnings in the experiments was explained. In the 
first part of the survey, we asked about general investment issues like the assets held, the 
                                                           
5
  We excluded investors that were no longer holding the account at the time we conducted the survey. We 
also did not invite investors that never placed a single trade and that were younger than 18 years. 
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number of investment accounts and investment goals. In this first part, investors also 
participated in a risk preferences elicitation experiment. Thereafter, more questions on 
investment behavior followed. Somewhere in the middle of the survey investors 
participated in an experiment eliciting their intrinsic social preferences. We asked all 
survey questions regarding socially responsible investing and social behavior after the 
experiments. 
 
3.3 The experiments 
Investors participated in a risk preferences elicitation experiment and in an interactive 
experiment with other investors where we elicited their social preferences. Investors were 
informed that at the end of the survey it would be determined randomly (with a chance of 
one out of ten) whether they will receive the earnings from the experiment or not.6 Those 
who were selected for payment got one of the experiments paid out at random. Investors 
received their earnings via bank transfer at the first working day after they completed the 
survey and payments were guaranteed by the authors’ university. We used a unique 
identification number to link the choices in the experiments and responses to the survey 
to our administrative data. We hired an external company specialized in conducting 
online research to handle the payments. This company does not have access to the trading 
records or other information of the investors. This procedure ensures the anonymity of 
investors. Survey participants were informed about these procedural details at the 
beginning of the survey. 
 
Risk preferences elicitation experiment 
We elicit risk preferences with incentivized multiple price list lotteries, similar to Holt 
and Laury (2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011). Investors faced 20 different decision 
situations and for each situation they decided between receiving a specific sure amount 
                                                           
6
  For a recent validation of this procedure, see Dohmen et al. (2011). 
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and a lottery with a 50% chance of winning 300 euro and a 50% chance of winning 
nothing. The sure amount was minimally 0 euro and maximally 190 euro and increased in 
steps of 10 euro from one to the next decision situation. The presented choice options can 
be found in Table A2 in the appendix. It was determined randomly which of the 20 
decisions is relevant for earnings.7 
The choices made by participants in each of the 20 decision situations inform us 
about their risk preferences. We use the point at which individuals switch between the 
lottery and the certain outcome as a measure of risk aversion. As the sure amount is 
ordered from low to high, a higher switching point indicates a more risk averse 
participant. 
 
Social preferences elicitation 
To measure intrinsic social preferences, we use a variant of the trust game experiment 
introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). The trust game is a two-player 
sequential game. In our version, both the first mover and the second mover are endowed 
with 50 euro. The first mover decides on the amount he or she wants to send to the 
second mover, which can be any multiple of 5 euro, including zero and 50. The amount 
sent is tripled by the experimenter and the second mover decides how much of the 
received money to return to the first mover. Hence, the earnings of the first mover are 50 
euro minus the amount sent plus the amount returned by the second mover. The earnings 
of the second mover are 50 euro plus triple the amount sent by the first mover minus the 
money sent back. 
Investors received instructions of the experiment online and had to answer a 
couple of comprehension questions about the rules of the game and how the payment is 
calculated before the experiment started. These questions were correctly answered by 
                                                           
7
  The experimental instructions are available upon request. 
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89.5% of the investors.8 Importantly, to exclude repeated game and reputation effects the 
trust game was played only once and investors were informed that they and the other 
participants in the experiment would remain anonymous during and after the experiment. 
In order to obtain a comprehensive measure of social preferences as well as for 
practical implementation reasons, we use the so-called strategy method (Selten, 1967), 
for second movers. Specifically, a second mover decides how much to send back, for 
each of the 11 possible amounts sent by the first mover – ranging from 0 euro to 50 euro. 
For other successful implementations of the strategy method see, e.g., Falk and Zehnder 
(2007), Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) and Falk, Meier and Zehnder (2012). 
Each investor was either a first or a second mover. We randomly match each 
second mover to a first mover and only the amount actually sent by the first mover 
determines the earnings. Moreover, second movers in the trust game are randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions. Under one condition, they are matched to a first mover 
who is a randomly chosen investor participating in the survey and the experiment. In the 
other condition, a second mover is randomly matched to a first mover who is a socially 
responsible investor participating in the survey and the experiment. We inform subjects in 
the introduction to the experiment in which condition they are, without telling them that 
there are two different conditions. 
The fact that the trust game is played only once rules out any repeated game 
effects. Moreover, second movers know that their behavior will never be revealed to 
anybody and is also only anonymously known to the experimenters, which minimizes 
reputation effects. Therefore, we can use second-mover behavior as an independent 
measure of their intrinsic social preferences. In Section 4.1 we specify two measures in 
more detail.9 
                                                           
8
  We run our main analysis with all investors and confirm in unreported regressions that the results stay 
the same when excluding investors who answered incorrectly to at least one question after three trials. 
9
  We also have data on the behavior of first movers in the trust game, but do not report on them here for 
brevity and because it is rather a measure of trust and not of prosocial behavior per se. 
13 
 
3.4 Variable descriptions 
All variables used in this paper are defined in Table 1.10 We first discuss the main 
variables from the administrative transaction data, second the survey questions, and third 
the experiments. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Administrative data 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that 14% of the investors in our sample hold SRI mutual funds. 
This percentage is not too far off the 18% for Dutch investors in general (Millward 
Brown, 2011). Panel A further shows that socially responsible investors on average hold 
14.9% of their portfolio in SRI funds while the remaining 85.1% are invested in 
conventional funds. Of the socially responsible investors, 19.5% only have SRI funds 
with tax incentives, 68.4% only have SRI funds without tax incentives and 12.1% hold 
both types of SRI funds. 
As a proxy for wealth, we use the (logarithm) of the total portfolio value in the 
month in which the investors participated in the survey and experiment. The average 
portfolio value of socially responsible investors is 106,678 euro (S.D. = 190,033), 
compared to 73,250 euro (S.D. = 127,344) for conventional investors. This difference is 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.000) (Table 2, Panel B). 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
                                                           
10
  The original questions in Dutch are available upon request. 
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Survey questions – Return expectations and risk perceptions 
To measure the returns that investors expect on SRI equity funds compared to 
conventional equity funds, we used the statement: “I expect that the returns of socially 
responsible equity funds compared to conventional equity funds are: Much lower, A bit 
lower, The same, A bit higher, Much higher, I do not know.” Only 3% of the socially 
responsible and 10.3% of the conventional investors choose “I do not know.” To measure 
risk perceptions of SRI equity funds compared to conventional equity funds, we asked 
investors to rate their agreement to the following statement: “Socially responsible equity 
funds are more risky than conventional equity funds.” They rated their agreement on a 1-7 
scale from 1 ‘Disagree completely” to 7 “Agree completely.” 
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 SOMEWHERE HERE> 
<INSERT FIGURE 2 SOMEWHERE HERE> 
 
In order to explore the determinants of whether an investor holds or does not hold SRI, 
we first examine whether conventional and socially responsible investors differ in their 
expectations regarding the returns of SRI. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of return 
expectations of investors for SRI equity in comparison to conventional equity funds (as 
defined in Table 1). The figure suggests that SR investors are slightly less pessimistic 
about returns of SRI than conventional investors. For instance, 51.9% of the socially 
responsible investors and 59.7% of the conventional investors expect to earn much or a 
bit lower returns on SRI funds than on conventional funds. The difference in distributions 
is statistically significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, p = 0.011, two-sided).11 
Figure 2 shows that the distribution of perceived riskiness of SRI equity funds relative to 
conventional equity funds (as defined in Table 1) is very similar for SR investors and 
conventional investors. For both investor types the median (mean) score is 4 (3.6), which 
                                                           
11
  We also run Mann-Whitney (MW) and t-tests to compare distributions. For that we encode the answers 
to the question on a Likert-scale from 1 = much lower to 5 = much higher. The results are similar (two-
sided p = 0.0002 for both tests). 
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is also the median (mean) score of the whole sample. Statistical tests corroborate that 
there is no difference in the distribution of perceived riskiness of SRI between investor 
types (p > 0.329, two-sided KS, MW, t-tests). Hence, both SR and conventional investors 
think that both fund categories carry similar risk. 
Notwithstanding the small quantitative difference, the discussed data reflect that 
both investor types are rather pessimistic about return expectations of SRI funds and 
perceive the riskiness of such funds similarly. This suggests that other motives than return 
expectations or risk perceptions must (also) play a role in the decision to invest into SR 
equity funds. Yet, another possibility could be that investors hold SRI funds for risk 
diversification reasons. Even if investors perceive the risk of SRI equity funds in isolation 
as about the same as the risk of conventional equity funds, they may want to reduce the 
overall portfolio risk by including SRI funds into their portfolio. Our survey data show 
that this motive is virtually absent. Only 5.1% of all SR investors indicate to hold SRI 
funds because of diversification benefits.  
 
Survey questions – Other variables 
With the survey we could also gather additional information of investors not provided in 
the administrative data. Investors rated their agreement to several statements on a 1-7 
scale from 1 “Disagree completely” to 7 “Agree completely.” We measured their self-
rated investment knowledge by the statement: “My investment knowledge is good.” A 
similar question is used by Dorn and Huberman (2005), Graham, Harvey and Huang 
(2009), Van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011). Socially responsible investors rate their 
knowledge as 4.19 on average (S.D. = 1.31) compared to 3.83 for conventional investors 
(S.D. = 1.47). This difference is highly significant (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.000) indicating 
that socially responsible investors rate their investment knowledge higher than 
conventional investors. 
To get a proxy for the extent to which investors can potentially get reputation 
benefits from socially responsible investments, we use the statement: “I often talk about 
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investments with others.” Socially responsible investors on average rate their agreement 
as 3.11 (S.D. = 1.51), compared to 2.91 (S.D. = 1.52) for conventional investors. The 
differences is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.001). 
 
Experiments 
Panel B of Table 2 also shows the risk preferences elicited by the experiment. Recall that 
the risk neutral switching point is 150 euro (50% chance to win 300 euro and 50% chance 
to win nothing). The average switching point for socially responsible investors is 113.29 
euro (S.D. = 41.57), compared to 112.23 euro (S.D. = 42.83) for conventional investors. 
This implies that both groups of investors are on average risk averse and the difference in 
risk preferences between SR and conventional investors is insignificant (Mann-Whitney, 
p = 0.723). 
 
4. Results 
In this section we test our main hypotheses. We distinguish between socially responsible 
and conventional investors using the administrative data.12 
 
4.1 Social preferences and investments in SRI funds 
We first test Hypothesis I that social preferences are an important determinant for 
investors to hold SRI funds. The first explanatory variable is our measure of the strength 
of intrinsic social preferences of investors. As explained in the experimental design 
section, we can use the behavior of second-movers in the trust game. Recall that we used 
the strategy method and that second-mover investors had to decide how much money to 
return for each possible amount of money received from first-mover investors, which 
                                                           
12
  If not stated otherwise, the administrative data refer to the month in which investors participated in the 
experiments and survey. In principle, it is possible that investors only hold SRI funds for a very short 
period. Therefore, in unreported analyses we conduct all tests and regressions also for investments into 
SRI funds exactly one month after the survey and experiment in 2011. The results are qualitatively 
similar. 
17 
 
lead to 10 decisions. There are several possibilities how to aggregate these decisions in 
order to arrive at a measure of intrinsic social preferences. We look at two natural 
measures. For the first measure, we calculate the average return ratio across all 10 
decisions. In other words, for each possible first mover transfer (i.e., 5 euro, 10 euro, …, 
50 euro) we calculate the ratio of the back-transfer and take the average. As a second 
measure we use the absolute amount a second-mover investor returns for the largest 
possible first-mover transfer of 50 euro.13 For convenience, in the regressions the variable 
is called “intrinsic social preferences”, irrespective of the used measure. 
Figure 3 shows that for each possible transfer by the first mover, second-movers 
return more if they are a socially responsible investor than if they are a conventional 
investor14. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the average return ratio of socially responsible 
investors is 1.53 and that of conventional investors is 1.42 (Mann-Whitney, p=0.087). 
Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) argue that the amount returned by second-movers 
for the maximum transfer (50 euro) is the best measure for social preferences because the 
stakes are the highest for this decision. For this maximum first mover transfer, socially 
responsible investors on average send back 77.46 euro (S.D. = 34.49) and conventional 
investors 71.61 euro (S.D. = 34.89). The difference is statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0.061). 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Next, we test for the previous findings more formally, while controlling for return 
expectations of SRI, perceived risk of SRI, and other control variables to be specified 
below. We will present two kinds of regression analyses. In the first we examine the 
determinants of the likelihood to hold at least one SRI mutual fund and in the second we 
                                                           
13
  For the latter measure, Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) show that it correlates strongly with 
donations, another domain of prosocial behavior. 
14
  The amount that investors return in the trust game is not significantly different for the two matching 
conditions described in section 3.3: an average return ratio of 1.44 compared to 1.40 (F-test, p = 0.216). 
Observations in both conditions are therefore pooled in the remaining analysis. 
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explore what determines the fraction of the total portfolio invested in SRI mutual funds 
by investors. We next explain the set of explanatory variables. 
To control for return expectations and perceived risks of SRI we use the answers 
to the survey questions regarding risk and return expectations on SRI funds (Figures 1 
and 2). For the regression analyses we create a dummy variable (Low expected returns on 
SRI) for expected returns on SRI that takes on value 1 if an investor believes that the 
expected return of a SRI fund is lower than the expected return of a conventional fund 
and zero otherwise. Similarly, for risk perception on SRI we create a dummy variable 
(Low perceived risk on SRI) that takes on value 1 if an investor believes that the return 
risk of a SRI fund is lower than the one of a conventional fund and zero otherwise15. 
To control for investment knowledge we employ three measures used and 
validated in related literature. We use, first, the log of the total portfolio value of an 
investor (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009), Keloharju, Knüpfer and Linnainmaa 
(2012)), second, investors answers to a financial knowledge question where they had to 
rate themselves on a 7-point Likert-scale from very poor to very good (Van Rooij, 
Lusardi and Alessie (2011), Dorn and Huberman (2005), Graham, Harvey and Huang 
(2009)), and third, a dummy variable indicating whether an investor has a university 
degree. 
We also control for investors' risk preferences as independently measured by the 
switch amount in our experimental risk preference elicitation task. Further control 
variables we include are gender (Female, which takes on value 1 if the investor is a 
woman, zero otherwise) and age (Age) of investors. We also use survey responses to 
control for Low Income, High Income and Untold Income, with Medium Income being 
the omitted reference category (for a precise definition of these variables, see Table 1). 
                                                           
15
 We use dummies for return expectations and risk perceptions of SRI funds instead of the scores 
themselves because it reduces the noise in the data, as there are relatively fewer observations in the 
extreme categories (see Figures 1 and 2). Moreover, generally the sores cannot be interpreted as linear 
variables. Nevertheless, to check for robustness, we have repeated the analyses with scores instead of 
dummies and find that all results remain qualitatively unchanged (see Table A3 in the appendix). 
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In order to examine the likelihood that an investor holds at least one SRI fund in 
the portfolio we run probit regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes on the value of 1 if an investor holds an SRI fund and 0 otherwise16. Table 3 shows 
the results. It presents marginal effects for the ease of exposition. 
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
We focus first on the specification where we use the average return ratio as a 
measure of the strength of Intrinsic Social Preferences (column (1) in Table 3). The table 
shows that stronger intrinsic social preferences have a significantly positive effect on the 
likelihood to invest socially responsible (p = 0.049). Specifically, an investor with a 1 
point higher average return ratio is 4.05 percentage points more likely to have SRI funds 
in the portfolio, which is a relatively large effect compared to the 14% of our sample that 
holds SRI funds. The result is similar when using our second measure of Intrinsic Social 
Preferences (column (2) Table 3). The regression table shows that an individual who 
sends back 10 euro more in the trust game is 0.80 percentage points more likely to hold 
SRI funds (p = 0.044). To illustrate the economic effect, consider an investor with a 
strength of intrinsic social preferences that makes him/her sending back an amount that 
equalizes earnings with the first-mover investor in the trust game experiment. Our 
regression result indicate that such a socially motivated investor is 8.3 percentage points 
more likely to invest socially responsible than a completely selfish investor (who returns 
nothing as second-mover in the trust game experiment). 
As already suggested by the results reported at the beginning of this section, 
expectations about the returns of SRI funds (in comparison to conventional funds) are 
statistically insignificantly related to the likelihood to invest socially responsible (p = 
0.277). Similarly, differences in risk perceptions about SRI funds do not significantly 
                                                           
16
 The total number of observations in the regressions is lower than the overall response rate to the survey. 
The reason is that investors were randomly assigned to different experiments and to a different role in 
the trust game. For instance, first movers in the trust game do not appear in our analyses. 
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contribute to the likelihood of holding SRI funds (p = 0.336). This holds irrespective of 
the measure used for Intrinsic Social Preferences. 
Table 3 further documents that investors with a larger portfolio (Log Total 
Portfolio Value) and with a higher rating of their Investment Knowledge are significantly 
more likely to invest socially responsible. The economic effects of these variables are 
similar in both reported regressions. Regarding the portfolio size, an investor with a 
100% larger portfolio is about 4.3 percentage points more likely to invest socially 
responsible (p = 0.000). This relatively strong effect is no surprise as investors with larger 
portfolios likely spread their larger wealth over various funds, including SRI funds. For 
investment knowledge the table shows that an investor who rates his/her investment 
knowledge one point higher on a 1-7 scale is between 1.86% and 1.89% more likely to 
invest socially responsible (p < 0.090). Importantly, none of the other characteristics 
significantly affects the probability to invest socially responsible.  
To explore whether the reported results on the likelihood to hold SRI funds are 
robust, we now examine the determinants of the percentage of SRI funds an investor 
holds in the portfolio. For that purpose, we conduct a Tobit regression that accounts for 
the censoring in the SRI share at 0% and 100%. Table 4 shows the results and reports the 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables. 
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The results in Table 4 show that investors with stronger intrinsic social 
preferences invest a larger share of their portfolio in SRI funds, which is consistent with 
the regression results regarding the likelihood of holding SRI funds reported above. For 
the first measure of social preferences, a one point higher return ratio is associated with 
an increased investment into SRI funds of 5.47% of the portfolio. For our second measure 
the result is similar. An investor who sends back 10 euro more in the trust game holds an 
additional 1.05% of his/her portfolio in socially responsible funds (p = 0.054). 
21 
 
The other explanatory variables also show a similar pattern as in the probit 
regressions. Specifically, return expectations and risk perceptions are not significantly 
related to the percentage of the portfolio that is invested socially responsible (p > 0.298 
for expected returns and p > 0.455 for risk perceptions). In both Tobit regressions also the 
portfolio size is significantly positively related to the percentage of SRI in an investor's 
portfolio. Specifically, a 100% larger total portfolio size leads to about an extra 3.3% in 
SRI funds (p < 0.013). Qualitatively, the only difference to the probit regressions is that 
now having a university degree predicts a higher fraction of SRI in the portfolio while 
self-reported investment knowledge is insignificant. In both regressions having a 
university degree increases the SRI share by about 7.2% (p < 0.059). 
To summarize, we find clear evidence that social preferences are an important 
determinant for the likelihood to invest socially responsible as well as for the fraction of 
SRI in an investor's portfolio. Next to social preferences the size of an investor's portfolio 
is related to investing socially responsible. Intriguingly, neither return expectations nor 
risk perceptions regarding SRI relative to conventional funds correlate with SRI. Taken 
together, these results point rather towards a preference-based explanation for 
investments in SRI funds than a belief-based explanation. 
 
4.2 Social preferences and the role of tax benefits in investing socially responsible 
As explained in Section 2, investors could choose for SRI mutual funds with or without 
tax benefits. In this section we test Hypothesis II that investors with strong social 
preferences are more likely to buy SRI funds without tax benefits but not more likely to 
buy SRI funds with tax benefits. We run a multinomial logit regression in which the 
dependent variable takes on four different values. The base group that is not reported 
consists of conventional investors. The other groups are investors who (1) only hold an 
SRI fund with tax benefits, (2) only hold an SRI fund without tax benefits, (3) hold both 
types of SRI funds. Since the results for our two measures of intrinsic social preferences 
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were almost identical in the previous analyses, for brevity we only report the results for 
the average return ratio here.17 
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 5 reports relative-risk ratios for the same set of explanatory variables as in 
the previous section. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that an investor with 
stronger intrinsic social preferences is more likely to hold an SRI fund without tax 
benefits. Specifically, column (2) of Table 5 shows that an investor with a one point 
higher return ratio in the trust game experiment is 47.9% more likely to only hold an SRI 
fund without tax benefits than being a conventional investor, i.e., holding no SRI fund (p 
= 0.027). Investors with stronger social preferences are insignificantly more likely to hold 
both SRI funds with and without tax incentives (p = 0.227) and insignificantly less likely 
to hold only SRI funds with tax benefits (p = 0.528). 
In line with our results reported in the previous section, return expectations and 
risk perceptions are insignificant. Investors with a larger total portfolio size are in general 
more likely to hold any type of SRI fund or both types. The coefficients are significant in 
all three columns. For example, an investor with a 100% larger portfolio is, compared to 
the base group, 66.9% more likely to only hold an SRI fund with tax benefits, 29.5% 
more likely to only hold an SRI fund without tax benefits and 128.1% more likely to hold 
both types of funds. This result is consistent with our interpretation that wealthier 
investors tend to diversify more and also include SRI in the diversification. In addition, 
investors who rate their investment knowledge one point higher on a 1-7 scale are 83.9% 
more likely to only hold an SRI fund with tax benefits than to only hold conventional 
funds (base group) (p = 0.008). There is no investment knowledge effect for the other 
investor groups. We also find that having a university degree marginally increases the 
likelihood to hold SRI funds with and without tax benefits (p = 0.064). Whereas being 
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 The results remain robust when using the other measure of intrinsic social preferences (see Table A4 in 
the appendix). 
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female and being older each has a marginally negative effect on holding only SRI funds 
with tax benefits (p = 0.074 and p = 0.056, respectively). 
We have argued that next to social preferences higher return expectations due to 
tax benefits could be a reason for holding SRI. This explanation would be consistent with 
the above analysis. Alternatively, however, some investors could hold SRI funds for 
reputational reasons and thus tend to hold tax beneficial SRI funds. These funds have 
lower financial costs (in terms of expected return) than non-tax beneficial SRI funds and 
could therefore be attractive for such investors. We further discuss this issue in Section 
4.3 below. 
An important difference between SRI funds with and without tax benefits is that 
the former are bond funds whereas the latter are equity funds (cf. Section 2). Therefore, 
risk averse investors might prefer SRI funds with tax benefits over SRI funds without tax 
benefits. We addressed this issue in three ways. First, we control for risk preferences in 
the regressions reported in this section. Second, as 99% of the socially responsible 
investors only invest part of their portfolio in SRI funds, their overall portfolio combines 
conventional equity and bond funds with SRI equity and SRI bond funds to achieve the 
desired level of portfolio risk. Third, we control for monthly portfolio returns and the 
average monthly standard deviation of portfolio returns in a robustness multinomial logit 
regression reported in Table 6. Adding these controls does not change the result regarding 
the effect of social preferences. Investors with stronger intrinsic social preferences are 
substantially more likely to invest in SRI funds without tax incentives while there is no 
effect on the likelihood to have SRI funds with tax benefits. In fact, the coefficients on 
intrinsic social preferences are almost identical with the result reported in Table 5. 
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
To shed more light on the financial motivations of socially responsible investors, 
we asked them for their main reason to invest socially responsible. Investors could 
choose from different categories and we define financial reasons as either ‘tax benefits’, 
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‘higher expected returns’, ‘a better risk-return trade-off’ or ‘risk diversification’. The data 
show that 27.2% of the investors give a financial reason to invest socially responsible. 
Figure 4 shows that investors who only hold SRI funds with tax benefits are most likely 
to give a financial reason for investing in SRI funds (43.9%), whereas only 35.7% of 
investors who hold both types of SRI funds and 21.8% of the investors who only hold 
SRI funds without tax benefits report a financial reason. This difference is statistically 
significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p= 0.0001). This evidence corroborates the finding that 
investors who are more prosocial in the experiment are only more likely to invest in SRI 
funds without tax benefits, because SRI funds with tax benefits attract many investors 
with financial motivations. 
<INSERT FIGURE 4 SOMEWHERE HERE> 
 
4.3 Intrinsic social preferences and reputation 
So far, we have shown that investors with stronger intrinsic social preferences are more 
likely to invest in socially responsible funds, especially in SRI funds without tax benefits. 
However, SRI funds are also held by investors without strong social preferences and 
especially the holding of SRI funds with tax benefits appears to be little related to 
intrinsic social preferences. Above, we have already provided evidence that tax benefits 
may give an incentive to hold SRI funds also for investors without strong social 
motivations for reasons of higher expected net-returns. 
In this section, we take a closer look at reputation as a possible motive to buy 
socially responsible mutual funds. As pro-sociality is commonly valued positively in 
society, investors without strong intrinsic social preferences who nevertheless hold SRI 
funds may use these investments as a signal of their prosocial personality. Consequently, 
a hypothesis that can be tested is that SR investors with stronger intrinsic social 
preferences are less likely to use SRI is a signaling tool. 
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We do not have data with which we could directly measure such reputation 
concerns but need to resort to a proxy. Recall, that investors in our dataset buy funds 
directly online without interference of an intermediary. Hence, if investors want to benefit 
from SRI funds as a signal for prosocial reputation they need to communicate it to others 
in one or the other way. In the survey, investors reported on how often they communicate 
about their investments by indicating their (dis)agreement with the statement “I often talk 
about investments to others.” on a 1-7 scale. We use answers to this question as our 
proxy.18 
<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 7 presents OLS regressions where only socially responsible investors are 
considered. The dependent variable represents the ratings of the extent to which socially 
responsible investors agree to the statement above. The results show that a one point 
higher return ratio in the trust game is associated with a 0.462 point decrease in the 
agreement to the statement above (p = 0.024). This implies that among SR investors those 
with weaker social preferences indeed talk more about investments and, hence, probably 
benefit more from signaling benefits. 
We hasten to note that we are aware of the many potential reasons for people to 
talk about their investments. Therefore, we view the presented evidence only as 
suggestive although such communication certainly is a necessary condition to signal 
prosocial behavior. Future research has to show the robustness of this result. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper shows that investors with stronger social preferences are more likely to hold 
SRI mutual funds without tax incentives. We use an anonymous experiment that rules out 
                                                           
18
 This question was asked at the beginning of the survey before any question on prosocial behavior. At 
that stage of the survey, no reference to socially responsible investments had been made yet. 
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reputation concerns as an explanation for prosocial behavior. The finding that 
investments in SRI funds are largely driven by social preferences rather than return or 
risk expectations suggests that socially responsible investments can have long run effects 
on stock prices if the growth in SRI continues. Currently, there is only a robust effect 
found for the influence of social preferences on the stock prices of sin companies, driven 
by institutional investors (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Stock prices of other types of 
socially responsible companies such as green companies and fair trade companies could 
be affected in the long run if the proportion of SR investors in the market will increase. 
More broadly, our paper shows that individuals who behave prosocially in one 
domain (the trust game) also behave more prosocially in another domain (socially 
responsible investments). Previous evidence on the stability of social preferences over 
various domains is mixed (Karlan (2005), List (2006), Benz and Meier (2008), Falk and 
Heckman (2009), Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010), Stoop, Noussair and Van Soest 
(2012)). For instance, List (2006) finds that sports cards traders behave substantially 
different in gift exchange in the lab and in the field. Stoop, Noussair and Van Soest 
(2012) find that fishermen cooperate in a standard monetary voluntary contribution 
mechanism, but fish more than the social optimum in a field setting. In contrast, Karlan 
(2005) finds that Peruvian microfinance borrowers are more likely to repay their loans if 
they give back more in a trust game. Benz and Meier (2008) find that students who 
donate more in a lab also donate more outside of the lab. The relation we find between 
behavior in the experiment and in the field is rather conservative, because investors in our 
study were unaware that we matched their survey responses and experimental behavior to 
their (anonymized) trading records. This mitigates the potential problem that socially 
responsible investors want to behave consistently prosocially in the experiment (for 
evidence on consistency see for instance Gneezy et al. 2012). Our evidence shows that 
introducing extrinsic rewards such as tax benefits in the field eliminates the relation 
between prosocial field behavior and prosocial behavior in an experiment that has no 
extrinsic rewards to prosocial behavior. 
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Our findings also have important practical consequences. First, banks and mutual 
fund providers can benefit from distinguishing between selfish and prosocial investors 
concerning their marketing strategies. The strong intrinsic motivation of many socially 
responsible investors might be undermined by advertisements that are focused too much 
on returns (Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a, b), Benabou and Tirole (2006)). In contrast, 
more selfish investors who hold SRI funds for reputation reasons might benefit from 
some signaling tools. Second, the Dutch government provides tax incentives on some 
types of SRI funds. Our findings suggest that intrinsic social preferences are unrelated to 
investments in these types of funds. In other words, these funds also attract selfish 
investors, which might reduce the amount invested socially responsible if the tax 
incentives decrease. In particular, because investors in SRI funds with tax benefits report 
good investment knowledge and might be well aware of outside investment opportunities. 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Variable definitions 
Variable Measure Type of data 
Socially responsible 
investor 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if an investor 
holds a socially responsible (SRI) mutual 
fund in his portfolio at the provider in the 
month that he participated in the 
experiments. 
Administrative 
Percentage SRI Total amount invested in SRI funds at the 
provider as a percentage of the total 
portfolio at the provider, in the month in 
which the investor participated in the 
experiments. 
Administrative 
Own SRI fund with 
tax benefits 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if an investor 
holds a SRI fund with tax benefits in the 
month he participated in the experiment 
and the experiments. 
Administrative 
Own SRI fund 
without tax benefits 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if an investor 
holds a SRI fund without tax benefits in 
the month he participated in the 
experiment and the experiments. 
Administrative 
Intrinsic social 
preferences (avg. 
Return ratio) 
We calculate the return ratio for each 
possible first mover transfer in the 
strategy method. For a 5 euro transfer, it 
is the ratio between the amount returned 
and the amount sent when the first mover 
sends 5 euro. For 10 euro it is the ratio 
between the amount returned and the 
amount sent when the first mover sends 
10 euro. We then take the average return 
ratio across the range of 5-50 euro first 
mover transfers. See Table A1 in the 
appendix for the full distribution of return 
ratios. 
Incentivized 
experiment 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
(max. transfer of 50 
euro) 
Amount that the investor sends back as a 
second mover in the trust game for a first 
mover transfer of 50 euro. 
Incentivized 
experiment 
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Expected return SRI I expect that the returns of socially 
responsible equity funds compared to 
conventional equity funds are: 
• Much lower 
• A bit lower 
• The same 
• A bit higher 
• Much higher 
• I do not know 
Survey 
Perceived risk on SRI Socially responsible equity funds are 
more risky than conventional equity 
funds (fully disagree 1-7 fully agree) 
Survey 
Lower expected 
return on SRI 
Dummy equal to 1 if an investor believes 
that the returns on SRI equity funds are 
lower than on conventional equity funds. 
Survey 
Lower perceived risk 
on SRI 
Dummy equal to 1 if an investor 
perceives the risk on SRI equity funds to 
be lower than the risk of conventional 
equity funds. 
 
Total Portfolio Value Total euro amount invested at the 
provider in the month that the investor 
participated in the experiments. 
Administrative 
Investment knowledge My investment knowledge is good (fully 
disagree 1-7 fully agree) 
Survey 
Risk preferences Amount at which the investor switches 
from choosing the risky lottery to 
choosing the risk-free option in the risk 
preference task. 
Incentivized 
experiment 
Low income Gross family income is below 60,000 
euro per year 
Survey 
Medium income Gross family income is between 60,000 
euro and 100,000 euro per year 
Survey 
High income Gross income is above 100,000 euro per 
year 
Survey 
Untold income The investor does not disclose his income Survey 
Talk about 
investments 
I often talk about investment with others 
(fully disagree 1-7 fully agree) 
Survey 
Mean portfolio 
returns 
Average monthly portfolio returns since 
the investor opened her account 
Administrative 
St. Dev. monthly 
portfolio returns 
Standard deviation of the monthly 
portfolio returns since the investor 
opened her account 
Administrative 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
This table presents background information from the transaction data on the portfolios of socially 
responsible and conventional investors. The statistics represent the portfolios of investors in the 
month in which they participated in the experiment and the survey.  
Panel A – Portfolios of socially responsible investors (14% of the sample) 
 
Percentage SRI in total 
portfolio 14.9% 
  
Only hold SRI with tax 
benefits 19.5% 
Only hold SRI without 
tax benefits 68.4% 
Hold both SRI with and 
without tax benefits 12.1% 
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Panel B – Comparison socially responsible and conventional investors 
This table presents the summary statistics for socially responsible and conventional investors separately. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. Standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are from Mann-Whitney 
tests. 
 
Socially responsible investors 
(14%) 
Conventional investors 
(86%)  
  Mean Median N Mean Median N P 
Intrinsic social preferences 
(Avg. Return ratio) 
1.5269 
(0.6695) 
1.73 140 1.4173 
(0.6749) 
1.51 763 0.087 
Intrinsic social preferences 
(Max. transfer of 50 euro) 
77.4643 
(34.4927) 
100.00 140 71.6121 
(34.8929) 
80.00 763 0.061 
Expected returns 2.7055 2.00 506 2.8206 2.00 2776 0.692 
on SRI (1.0041) 
  
(1.3229) 
  
  
Expected risk  3.5377 4.00 504 3.5742 4.00 2750 0.385 
on SRI (1.2653) 
  
(1.2458) 
  
  
Lower expected  0.5193 1.00 491 0.5974 1.00 2489 0.001 
returns on SRI (0.5001) 
  
(0.4905) 
  
  
Lower perceived 0.4345 0.00 504 0.3895 0.00 2750 0.057 
risk on SRI (0.4962) 
  
(0.4877) 
  
  
Total portfolio 106677.80 57665.95 747 73250.33 36495.54 4494 0.000 
Value (190033.20) 
  
(127344.30) 
  
  
Investment  4.1916 4.00 642 3.8276 4.00 3881 0.000 
knowledge (1.3073) 
  
(1.4734) 
  
  
University degree 0.4990 0.00 487 0.4622 0.00 2609 0.136 
 
(0.5005) 
  
(0.4987) 
  
  
Risk preferences 113.2909 110.00 550 112.2275 110.00 3129 0.723 
 
(41.5708) 
  
(42.8290) 
  
  
Female 0.1810 0.00 746 0.2094 0.00 4585 0.075 
 
(0.3852) 
  
(0.4069) 
  
  
Age 57.7542 57.00 716 59.1040 59.00 4377 0.002 
 
(12.1359) 
  
(11.6319) 
  
  
Low income 0.3223 0.00 484 0.3228 0.00 2590 0.984 
 
(0.4678) 
  
(0.4676) 
  
  
High income 0.2087 0.00 484 0.1965 0.00 2590 0.538 
 
(0.4068) 
  
(0.3974) 
  
  
Untold income 0.1798 0.00 484 0.1772 0.00 2590 0.894 
  (0.3844)     (0.3819)       
Talk about investments 
(1-7) 
3.1122 
(1.5123) 3 642 
2.9093 
(1.5217) 3 3881 0.001 
36 
 
Table 3 – Likelihood to own a SRI fund 
This table presents marginal effects of probit regressions in which the dependent variable takes on 
the value of 1 if an investor holds a SRI mutual fund in the month that he participated in the 
experiment and survey. In the first specification ‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the average return 
ratio across all possible first mover transfers from 5 euro through 50 euro. In the second 
specification ‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the amount returned by the second mover in the 
strategy method trust game in units of 10 euro for a maximum transfer of the first mover of 50 
euro. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * is 10% ** is 
5% and *** is 1% significance. 
 Avg. Return Ratio 
(1) 
Max. Transfer of 50 Euro 
(2) 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social preferences 0.0405** 
(0.0205) 
0.0080** 
(0.0040) 
 
BELIEFS 
Lower expected returns on 
SRI 
-0.0295 
(0.0271) 
-0.0295 
(0.0271) 
Lower perceived risk on 
SRI 
-0.0257 
(0.0267) 
-0.0253 
(0.0267) 
 
CONTROLS 
Log total portfolio value 0.0431*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0427*** 
(0.0098) 
Investment knowledge 0.0189* 
(0.0107) 
0.0186* 
(0.0107) 
University degree 0.0390 
(0.0281) 
0.0383 
(0.0281) 
Risk preferences -0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
Female -0.0447 
(0.0336) 
-0.0446 
(0.0337) 
Age -0.0021 
(0.0013) 
-0.0021 
(0.0013) 
Low income 0.0299 
(0.0361) 
0.0296 
(0.0361) 
High income -0.0411 
(0.0347) 
-0.0412 
(0.0347) 
Untold income 0.0157 
(0.0416) 
0.0154 
(0.0416) 
Base probability 0.1574 0.1574 
 
N 764 
Pseudo R2 0.0522 0.0525 
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Table 4 – Percentage invested in SRI funds 
This table presents marginal effects of tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
percentage of the portfolio that is held in SRI mutual fund in the month that he participated in the 
experiment and survey. The regressions account for left-censoring at 0% and right-censoring at 
100%. In the first specification ‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the average return ratio across all 
possible first mover transfers from 5 euro through 50 euro. In the second specification ‘Intrinsic 
social preferences’ is the amount returned by the second mover in the strategy method trust game 
in units of 10 euro for a maximum transfer of the first mover of 50 euro. All other variables are 
defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * is 10% ** is 5% and *** is 1% 
significance. 
 Avg. Return Ratio 
(1) 
Max. Transfer of 50 Euro 
(2) 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
5.4702** 
(2.8058) 
1.0537* 
(0.5457) 
 
BELIEFS 
Lower expected returns 
on SRI 
-3.7611 
(3.6141) 
-3.7700 
(3.6167) 
Lower perceived risk on 
SRI 
-2.7315 
(3.6567) 
-2.6571 
(3.6573) 
 
CONTROLS 
Log total portfolio value 3.3022** 
(1.3089) 
3.2438** 
(1.3044) 
Investment knowledge 1.2730 
(1.4460) 
1.2208 
(1.4462) 
University degree 7.2647* 
(3.7926) 
7.1795* 
(3.7957) 
Risk preferences -0.0251 
(0.0459) 
-0.0257 
(0.0459) 
Female -6.6990 
(5.2547) 
-6.7225 
(5.2625) 
Age -0.2787 
(0.1785) 
-0.2795 
(0.1786) 
Low income 6.6228 
(4.6470) 
6.5796 
(4.6497) 
High income -4.6530 
(5.2908) 
-4.6597 
(5.2907) 
Untold income 4.8875 
(5.3374) 
4.8665 
(5.3398) 
Constant -64.1831*** 
(18.4161) 
-63.0121*** 
(18.2459) 
 
N 764 
Pseudo R2 0.0137 0.0137 
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Table 5 – Probability to invest in a SRI fund with tax benefits and without tax 
benefits 
This table presents relative-risk ratios of a multinomial logit regression in which the dependent 
variable can take on four different values. The baseline group (not reported) is conventional 
investors, the second group is investors who only hold a SRI fund with tax benefits, the third only 
holds SRI fund without tax benefits and the fourth holds both types of SRI funds. ‘Intrinsic social 
preferences’ is the average return ratio across all possible first mover transfers from 5 euro 
through 50 euro. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * is 
10% ** is 5% and *** is 1% significance. 
Only SRI funds with tax benefits 
(1) 
without tax benefits 
(2) 
with and without 
tax benefits (3) 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
0.8089 
(0.2717) 
1.4791** 
(0.2626) 
1.9400 
(1.0638) 
 
BELIEFS 
Lower expected 
returns on SRI 
1.4309 
(0.7585) 
0.7319 
(0.1612) 
0.5519 
(0.3549) 
Lower perceived 
risk on SRI 
1.5537 
(0.7548) 
0.6964 
(0.1571) 
1.2696 
(0.8042) 
 
CONTROLS 
Log total portfolio 
value 
1.6691** 
(0.3661) 
1.2953*** 
(0.1078) 
2.2811*** 
(0.7337) 
Investment 
knowledge 
1.8387*** 
(0.4252) 
1.0812 
(0.0942) 
1.1280 
(0.2629) 
University degree 0.4103 
(0.2275) 
1.4316 
(0.3346) 
4.6472* 
(3.8557) 
Risk preferences 0.9954 
(0.0058) 
0.9986 
(0.0028) 
0.9964 
(0.0087) 
Female 0.6815 
(0.5361) 
0.5262* 
(0.1891) 
2.9819 
(2.0591) 
Age 1.0287 
(0.0247) 
0.9792* 
(0.0108) 
0.9556 
(0.0321) 
Low income 1.0665 
(0.6420) 
1.2132 
(0.3502) 
1.9843 
(1.5460) 
High income 0.0000 
(0.0004) 
0.9170 
(0.2833) 
0.2401 
(0.2763) 
Untold income 1.1449 
(0.7617) 
1.0630 
(0.3528) 
0.8343 
(0.7622) 
 
N 764 
Pseudo R2 0.0916 
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Table 6 – Controlling for portfolio returns and standard deviations 
This table presents relative-risk ratios of a multinomial logit regression in which the dependent 
variable can take on four different values. The baseline group (not reported) is conventional 
investors, the second group is investors who only hold a SRI fund with tax benefits, the third only 
holds SRI fund without tax benefits and the fourth holds both types of SRI funds. ‘Intrinsic social 
preferences’ is the average return ratio across all possible first mover transfers from 5 euro 
through 50 euro. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * is 
10% ** is 5% and *** is 1% significance. 
Only SRI funds with tax benefits 
(1) 
without tax benefits 
(2) 
with and without 
tax benefits (3) 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
0.7985 
(0.2734) 
1.4759** 
(0.2621) 
1.9164 
(1.0580) 
 
BELIEFS 
Lower expected 
returns on SRI 
1.6320 
(0.8816) 
0.7302 
(0.1612) 
0.5236 
(0.3408) 
Lower perceived risk 
on SRI 
1.7162 
(0.8639) 
0.6911 
(0.1563) 
1.2474 
(0.7912) 
 
CONTROLS 
Monthly portfolio 
returns 
0.3140*** 
(0.1370) 
1.0587 
(0.2120) 
2.0373 
(1.3918) 
St. Dev. monthly 
portfolio returns 
0.8721 
(0.1158) 
1.0395 
(0.0486) 
1.0707 
(0.1370) 
Log total portfolio 
value 
1.6762** 
(0.3805) 
1.2961*** 
(0.1077) 
2.2590** 
(0.7240) 
Investment 
knowledge 
2.0136*** 
(0.4868) 
1.0618 
(0.0955) 
1.0753 
(0.2591) 
University degree 0.3647* 
(0.2064) 
1.4335 
(0.3363) 
4.9624* 
(4.1440) 
Risk preferences 0.9958 
(0.0058) 
0.9986 
(0.0028) 
0.9964 
(0.0087) 
Female 0.6195 
(0.4908) 
0.5404* 
(0.1950) 
3.4751* 
(2.4993) 
Age 1.0343 
(0.0251) 
0.9789* 
(0.01085) 
0.9555 
(0.0322) 
Low income 1.0484 
(0.6286) 
1.2316 
(0.3567) 
1.9153 
(1.5119) 
High income 0.0000 
(0.0003) 
0.9113 
(0.2834) 
0.2284 
(0.2641) 
Untold income 1.1603 
(0.7825) 
1.0708 
(0.3555) 
0.7215 
(0.6865) 
 
N 764 
Pseudo R2 0.1010 
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Table 7 – Intrinsic social preferences and reputation 
This table presents OLS regressions only for socially responsible investors. The dependent 
variable is the ratings of the agreement of socially responsible investors on a 1-7 Likert scale to 
the statement ‘I often talk about investments to others.’ Socially responsible investors who talk 
more about their investments with others can potentially gain more reputation benefits than 
socially responsible investors who cannot signal to others that they invest socially responsible. 
‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the average return ratio across all possible first mover transfers 
from 5 euro through 50 euro. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. * is 10% ** is 5% and *** is 1% significance. 
 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
-0.4618** 
(0.2014) 
 
BELIEFS 
Lower expected returns 
on SRI 
0.0749 
(0.0955) 
Lower perceived risk on 
SRI 
0.1003 
(0.2720) 
 
CONTROLS 
Log total portfolio value -0.0114 
(0.1102) 
Investment knowledge 0.4546*** 
(0.1216) 
University degree 0.0928 
(0.2725) 
Risk preferences 0.0032 
(0.0034) 
Female -0.0931 
(0.4034) 
Age -0.0009 
(0.0133) 
Low income -0.0894 
(0.3356) 
High income -0.4258 
(0.3894) 
Untold income -0.3076 
(0.3776) 
Constant 1.5374 
(1.3416) 
 
N 132 
R squared 0.1718 
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Figures 
Figure 1 – Return expectations of SRI funds 
This figure presents the separate distributions of return expectations for socially responsible and 
conventional investors. The variable ‘Expected return SRI’ depicts the response to the statement 
‘I expect that the returns of socially responsible equity funds compared to conventional equity 
funds are:’ from ‘much lower’ to ‘much higher’. The category ‘I don’t know’ is excluded from the 
figure; it was chosen by 3% of the socially responsible and 10.3% of the conventional investors. 
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Figure 2 – Risk perceptions of SRI funds 
This figure presents the separate distributions of risk perceptions of SRI funds for socially 
responsible and conventional investors. The variable ’Expected risk SRI’ is the response of 
investors on a 1-7 Likert scale to the statement: “Socially responsible equity funds are more risky 
than conventional equity funds” where 1 is fully disagree and 7 fully agree. 
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Figure 3 – Intrinsic social preferences 
This figure shows the average return ratio for second-movers in the trust game for each possible 
positive transfer by the first mover. The average return ratio is calculated for socially responsible 
and conventional investors separately. We used the strategy method to elicit these return ratios as 
described in section 3.3. A return ratio of 1 means that the second mover sends back exactly the 
same amount as received by the first mover. 
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Figure 4 – Financial motives and portfolio choice 
To shed more light on the role of financial motivations on portfolio choice, we directly asked 
socially responsible investors why they invest in socially responsible mutual funds. The answer 
options are: (1) environment, (2) social involvement, (3) tax benefits, (4) higher expected returns, 
(5) better risk-return trade-off, (6) risk diversification, (7) long investment horizon of SRI, (8) 
other, (9) I would not (again) invest in SRI, (10) I do not know and (11) I do not want to tell. We 
classify (3)-(6) as financial reasons. We use the administrative data to distinguish between 
socially responsible investors that only hold SRI funds without tax benefits, those that hold SRI 
funds with and without tax benefits and investors that only hold SRI funds with tax benefits. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Respondents and overall sample characteristics 
This table compares the mean characteristics of all invited investors to those for the respondents 
to the survey and experiments. The variables are defined in Table 1. Note that for our research 
design, we on purpose oversampled socially responsible investors in the survey to increase the 
power of our analyses in which we compare SR to conventional investors. The response rate for 
SR investors is 12% and that for conventional investors is 8% 
 Invited sample 
(n = 39,379) 
Respondents 
(n = 3,254) 
Female 24.7% 20.6% 
Age 55.5 57.9 
Total portfolio value (euro) 61,509 74,259 
% Holds only SRI funds 
without tax benefits 7.6% 10.2% 
% Holds only SRI fund 
with tax benefits 1.8% 2.9% 
% Holds SRI funds with 
and without tax benefits 0.6% 0.8% 
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Table A2 – Design of the risk preferences experiment 
  Safe Payment  Lottery 
1) €0 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
2) €10 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
3) €20 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
4) €30 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
5) €40 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
6) €50 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
7) €60 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
8) €70 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
9) €80 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
10) €90 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
11) €100 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
12) €110 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
13) €120 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
14) €130 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
15) €140 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
16) €150 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
17) €160 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
18) €170 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
19) €180 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
20) €190 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning €300 and 50 percent chance of winning €0 
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Table A3 – Likelihood to own a SRI fund – using expected return and perceived risk 
scores 
This table presents marginal effects of probit regressions in which the dependent variable takes on 
the value of 1 if an investor holds a SRI mutual fund in the month that he participated in the 
experiment and survey. In the first specification ‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the average return 
ratio across all possible first mover transfers from 5 euro through 50 euro. In the second 
specification ‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the amount returned by the second mover in the 
strategy method trust game in units of 10 euro for a maximum transfer of the first mover of 50 
euro. All other variables are defined in Table 1. For the variable ‘Expected Return SRI’ we assign 
a value of 1 to an investor who expects much lower returns and a value of 5 to an investor who 
expects much higher returns. The variable ‘Perceived Risk SRI’ is a 7-point Likert scale where 1 
means totally disagree to the statement ‘socially responsible equity funds are more risky than 
conventional equity funds’ and 7 means completely agree. Standard errors are in parentheses. * is 
10% ** is 5% and *** is 1% significance. 
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 Avg. Return Ratio 
(1) 
Max. Transfer of 50 Euro 
(2) 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
0.0413** 
(0.0205) 
0.0081** 
(0.0040) 
 
BELIEFS 
Expected returns on SRI 
(1-5) 
0.0216 
(0.0163) 
0.0213 
(0.0163) 
Perceived risk on SRI (1-
7) 
0.0134 
(0.0107) 
0.0132 
(0.0107) 
 
CONTROLS 
Log total portfolio value 0.0432*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0428*** 
(0.0098) 
Investment knowledge 0.0195* 
(0.0106) 
0.0193* 
(0.0106) 
University degree 0.0390 
(0.0281) 
0.0383 
(0.0281) 
Risk preferences -0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
Female -0.0437 
(0.0337) 
-0.0436 
(0.0337) 
Age -0.0020 
(0.0013) 
-0.0020 
(0.0013) 
Low income 0.0276 
(0.0360) 
0.0275 
(0.0360) 
High income -0.0420 
(0.0346) 
-0.0421 
(0.0346) 
Untold income 0.0157 
(0.0415) 
0.0154 
(0.0415) 
Base probability 0.1570 0.1570 
 
N 764 
Pseudo R2 0.0536 0.0538 
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Table A4 – Probability to invest in a SRI fund with tax benefits and without tax 
benefits – using back transfer for a max. of 50 euro as social preference measure 
This table presents relative-risk ratios of a multinomial logit regression in which the dependent variable can 
take on four different values. The baseline group (not reported) is conventional investors, the second group 
is investors who only hold a SRI fund with tax benefits, the third only holds SRI fund without tax benefits 
and the fourth holds both types of SRI funds. ‘Intrinsic social preferences’ is the amount returned by the 
second mover in the strategy method trust game in units of 10 euro for a maximum transfer of the first 
mover of 50 euro. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * is 10% ** 
is 5% and *** is 1% significance. 
Only SRI funds with tax benefits 
(1) 
without tax benefits 
(2) 
with and without 
tax benefits (3) 
PREFERENCES 
Intrinsic social 
preferences 
0.9997 
(0.0652) 
1.0756** 
(0.0348) 
1.1487 
(0.1114) 
 
BELIEFS 
Lower expected 
returns on SRI 
1.4312 
(0.7574) 
0.7331 
(0.1615) 
0.5434 
(0.3503) 
Lower perceived 
risk on SRI 
1.5554 
(0.7550) 
0.6993 
(0.1576) 
1.2231 
(0.7762) 
 
CONTROLS 
Log total portfolio 
value 
1.6813** 
(0.3690) 
1.2907*** 
(0.1071) 
2.2807*** 
(0.7314) 
Investment 
knowledge 
1.8304*** 
(0.4228) 
1.0794 
(0.0942) 
1.1353 
(0.2669) 
University degree 0.4128 
(0.2283) 
1.4217 
(0.3325) 
4.7569* 
(3.9589) 
Risk preferences 0.9955 
(0.0058) 
0.9985 
(0.0028) 
0.9961 
(0.0086) 
Female 0.6836 
(0.5368) 
0.5294* 
(0.1902) 
3.0479 
(2.1169) 
Age 1.0289 
(0.0247) 
0.9790* 
(0.0107) 
0.9552 
(0.0323) 
Low income 1.0592 
(0.6371) 
1.2123 
(0.3497) 
2.0091 
(1.5704) 
High income 0.0000 
(0.0004) 
0.9089 
(0.2810) 
0.2364 
(0.2720) 
Untold income 1.1438 
(0.7609) 
1.0601 
(0.3518) 
0.8330 
(0.7622) 
 
N 764 
Pseudo R2 0.0916 
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Figure A1 – Website of the mutual fund provider 
Investors buy funds via the product selector on the website of the provider. The product selector 
presents the investment category and information regarding the performance, fees, investment 
policies etc. 
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